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Interstate Extradition.
A fugitive from justice who has been surrendered by one State of the
Union to another State, upon requisition charging him with the commis-
sion of a specific crime, has, under the Constitution and laws of the
United States, no right, privilege or immunity to be exempt from indict-
ment and trial in the State to which he is returned, for any other or dif-
ferent offence from that designated in the requisition, without first having
an opportunity to return to the State from which he was extradited.
Opinion by Mr. Justice.JACKSON.
1 On receiving the following annotation from E. Clinton RHOADS,
Esq., before the decision of the Supreme Court, it was my intention to
publish the same in THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER AND R.EviEw,
accompanying the annotation with a note, in which I should have endeav-
ored to combat the principle that a man extradited from one State to
another cannot be tried on a different charge than that set forth in the
Warrant of extradition, a principle for which Mr. RHOADS so forcibly
contends. The final settlement of the question by the Supreme Court of
the United States in an opinion by Mr. Justice JACKSON, has rendered it
unnecessary that I should add anything further on the subject. It is
well, however, that the readers of THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER AND
REvIEW should know all that could be said on the other side. And,
therefore, I have requested that Mr. RHOADS' annotation, as origi-
nally submitted to me, should be published, adding thereto a supple-
mentary note containing abstracts from the opinion of Mr. Justice
JACKSON, showing the reasons which have induced the Court to finally
determine that they will not apply the principles expressed in the case
of in re Rauscher to interstate extradition, because there is a fundamental
difference between two States of the United States and two independent
and sovereign nations.
GEO. S. GRAHAM.
2 148 U. S., 537. Decided April 3, 1893.
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THE RIGHTS OF A PRISONER EXTRADITED FROM ON" STATE TO
ANOTHER TRIED ON A DIFFERENT CHARGE FROM THAT
CONTAINED IN THE WARRANT OF EXTRADITION.
The reason of the theory that
one extradited from one State for
one offense cannot be tried for
,any other is that the accused,
being a peaceful resident of the
aiylum State, cannot justly be
deprived of his liberty save by
due process of -law; that the
process of law invoked to deprive
him of that liberty is the exec-
utive warrant for his surrender
based upon certain necessary form-
alities ; that both the warrant and
its attending formalities are author-
ized under the Constitution of the
United States and Section 5278 of
the Revised Statutes; and that
when for any reason the proceed-
ings under the warrant have come
to an end, the citizen is entitled to
be restored to the liberty of which'
that warrant deprived him.
There are cases of which Kerr
v. Illinois, II9 U. S., 436, and
Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S., 700,
are types which decide that the
kidnaping of the defendant, and
thereby bringing him forcibly into
the jurisdiction where he is tried,
furnished no defense to the accused..
While even this seems ai abuse of
legal process, there is a clear differ-
encebetween the rights a defend-
ant would have upon a trial of a
case when his original arrest had
been by virtue of extradition pro-
ceedings, and, on the other hand,
where the defendant had been
either kidnaped or fraudulently
induced to come within the juris-
diction. See Re Cross, 43 F. R.,
517.
At first the preponderance of
authority seemed to be in favor of
the doctrine that the offense for
which the defendant had been ex-
tradited was immaterial; once in
the State he could be tried- on any
charge.
One of the most important
authorities' is the case of In re
Noyes, 17 Alb. Law Journal, 407
(1878).
The prisoner was extradited from
Washington City to New Jersey,
the demanding State, and indicted
for crimes not the basis of the ex-
tradition.
Judge Nixon, for the United
,States District Court of New Jersey,
refused to discharge the prisoner
upon habeas, corpus, and ruled
the case "substantially upon two
grounds:
kI) That the private injury in-
volved in the wrongful arrest is no
answer to the indictment for a
• crime.
(2) That the principles regarding
international extradition were not
involved.
The opinion in this case is also a
very instructive argument. As the
case of In re Rancher, iI9 U. S.,
407, had not been decided, it might
have been argued on the authority
of Adriance v. La Grave, 59 N. Y.,
I IO (1874) -that the same rule would
be applied to international extra-
dition.
The case of In re Noyes is fol-
lowdd by the courts of New York
in Martin v. Woodhall, 4 N. Y.
Supp., 539. Also in -the late case
of People ex -rel. Post i9, N. Y.
-Supp., 271 and Com. v. Johnson
12 CO. Ct. R., Pa. 263.
The case of Hackney v. Welsh,
Io7 Ind., 253, was ruled upon the
same principles, though somewhat
different in its facts. A prisoner
charged with crime in Michigan
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-came voluntarily into Indiana-
requisition from Michigan to In-
diana-escaped 'and fled to Ohio;
requisition from Indiana to Ohio.
Upon this proceeding he was ac-
quitted in Indiana. The question
to be decided was, could he then
be held by the Indiana authorities
-to answer the requisition from the
Governor of Michigan? and it was
'held that the prisoner could be
kept in Indiana and returned to
Michigan by the authority of the
Michigan requisition. See also
People v. Sinnott, 2o Alb. L. 3.,
230.
The next case of importance is
State v. Stewart, 6o Wis., 587. The
defendant was extradited 'from
Indiana to Wisconsin upon the
charge of larceny. He was ac-
-quitted of this charge and rear-
rested and convicted of false pre-
tenses; this conviction was upheld.
'These are followed by a large num-
ber of cases which decide practi-
-cally the same thing: State v. Ham,
4 Texas App., 645. Moore on Ex-
-tradition, J 642, el seq., contains an
able discussion of the question, and
endorses the doctrine of the prin-
cipal case. See also Hawley on
Interstate Extradition, i89o).
- All these cases make a distinction
between international extradition
and interstate rendition.
Since the decision of the Supreme
,Court in the case of In re Rauscher,
19 U. S., 407, although that case
was one of international extradi-
"tion, the theory that one extradited
from one State to another cannot
be tried .except for the crime or
crimes mentioned in the warrant
of extradition, has been regarded
with greater favor than it was be-
fore. Probably the most distinct
ruling was in the executive depart-
ment of New York in In re Hope,
io Alb. Law Journal, 441; 7 N: Y"
Cr. R., 4o6 (1889). Hope hadbeen
convicted in Delaware, and had
escaped from prison and gone to
California. Being extradited from
California to Yew York, served his
term in a New York prison and was
then claimed upon a requisition
from the State of Delaware. Gov-
ernor Hill, after a well-reasoned
decision, based chiefly upon the in-
terpretation of the Rauscher case,
discharged the prisoner, and stated
as his conviction the. following:
"The true theory which now seems
to be firmly established is that the
State should not be allowed to ob-
tain jurisdiction of a fugitiv6 from
justice and then to take advantage
of that jurisdiction thus obtained,
and use it for another and different
purpose; that a fugitive surrendered
on one charge is exempt from prose-.
cution on any other; that he is in the
State by compulsion of law upon a
single accusation, ard has a rightto
have that disposed of, that if after
his release he remains in the State
beyond a reasonable time, he can
then be arrested, but not other-
wise." The note upon the case in
7 N. Y. Cr., 4o6, is a valuable one.
The United States Circuit Court
for the Southern District of New
York, ini two cases has adopted the
principle of the Hope case: In re
Baruch, 24 Alb. N. C., 1o8; In -re
Renitz, 23 Alb. N. C., 69.
This latter case contains a note
citing a contrary decision by the
local New York Courts, made by
INGRAHAM, J.
Outside of New York, the leading
early case was that of re Cannon,
47 Mich., 481, which was that of a
surrender from Kansas to Michi-
gan upon the charge of seduction.
This was abandoned, and the de-
fendant rearrested on the ground
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of bastardy. This arrest the courts
of Michigan. refused to sustain.
(Reported also with note, 3 C. L.
Mag., 229.)
The case of In re Fiton, 45 F. R.,
471 (189 , C. C. of Vt., WHEmL-
IR, J., was a requisition by Ver-
mont upon New York for larceny.
* There was a waiver by the prisoner
of formal deects upon the condi-
'tioil of being tried only for larceny.
'He was then rearrested in New York
for forgery, and upon a habeas cor-
p us dsiaarged. The Court said:
"Thathe was deceived or forced
into i coming would afford no
grounds for release in this matter.
Ifiquiry can be made.into his rights
* arsing Iout of the proceedings
against him under the Constitution
and'laws of the United States.'..
The requisition rested altogether
* upon the constitutionality.of these
laws, and violation of a right im-
plied out of them Would be a viola-
tion of them."
In the similar ease-Ex fiarte
Skills, 5o F. R., 524-the District
Court of Minnesota admitted the
principle as stated in re Fiton, but
held that the matter was an objec-
tion which could be taken advan-
tage of by an appeal to the State
courts.
.I1 re Robinson, 45 N. W. Rep.,
257 (r8go), was the case of an arrest
by a constable upon a warrant issued
in Nebraska. The arrest was made
in Kansas, and there was a forcible
removal, to Nebraska. On habeas
corbus the prisoner was discharged,
the Court holding that such an act
was equivalent to extraditing upon
one charge and trying upon an-
other.
The case of State v. Hall, 40
Kansas, 338 (1889), arose upon a
motion to quash a second indict-'
ment, the Supreme Court of Kan-
sas held the State could not try for
a different offense than that charged.
See also State v. Simmons, Kan.,
262 ; IMfalcolmson i. Scott, 56 Mich.,
459; Tennessee v. Jickson, 36 F. R.,
258; State v. Vanderpool, 39' Ohio,
273.
A strong article supporting this.
view of the case is contained in 24.
Weekly Law Bulletin.
The principle which refuses to
permit a niw arrest upon a differ-
ent charge, does not prevent varia-
tion of the charge-which may be
necessary for mere purposes of
pleading: Hareaud v. Territory, 13
Pac. R., 1r ; 3 Wash. Ty., 131 ;
Watermdn v. State, 18 N. E., 63 ;
116 Ind,_ 51.
The reasoning of these cases.
seems to the writer to be sound.
It is admitted that before an asylums
State is justified in delivering the
fugitive, the demand must be made-
by the demanding State in a certain
form, and both the executive and
the courts have an opportunity, at
the instance of the accusVd, to de-
termine certaiu matters pertaining:
to the requisition, for instance:
First. -They may determine-
whether he is a fugitive: Moore on
Extradition, 562, et seq.; Wilcox
v. Nolze, 34 Ohio (0. S.), 520; Exfi.
McCabe, 46 F. R., 363; Com. v.
McCandless, 7 Co. CL R. (Pa.), 61
Com. v. Trach, 3 C. C. R., 115 ; In
re Cook, 49 F. R, 833, t46 U. S.
183, 14 Cr. Law Mag., 17. -
Second.- Whether the matter
charged is a crime: Extradition
Cases, 9 Co. Ct. R., Pa. 27.
Third.-Wlietber the indictment
or affidavit is sufficiently specific :
Roberts v. Reilly, 116V. S., 95; In
re Manchester, 5 Cal., 537; Exfi.
Jos. Smith, 3 McLean, I21; Jones'v.
Conard, 50 Iowa, io6; In re Mohr,.
73 Ala., 503; Hartman v. Avaline,
63 Ind., 353.
All these are matters which the
SUPPLE-MENTARY NOTE.
p:isoner has a right to have con-
sidered before the executive of the
asylum State surrenders him. Of
what use are all these safeguards
if a simple falsehood or groundless
charge is to be allowed to suspend
them?
In the case of kidnaping from a
foreign country, there is no viola-
tion of the laws ofthe United States.
The defendant must depend upon'
his personal rights upon the place
of his residence. (In the Kerr case,
this would have been Peru.) In
interstate rendition, however, the
matter is different. The prosecutor
in Philadelphia, and the accused in
Chicago, hold their personal rights
under the same federal constitution.
Any violation of that right is a
violation of the very law upon
which the rendition is made. These
considerations seem to answer the
argument that if a man kidnaped
from a foreign country has no per-
sonal rights, a fortiori, a person
brought from another State has
'none.
Even if it be admitted that the
governor of the asylum State acts
merely in a ministerial way in sur-
rendering the fugitive within his
State, and that the States of the
Union cannot treat with each other
.as independent nations under an
extradition treaty, but practically
as different counties under one
State I do not see that there is
justification for a surrender for one
charge and trial in the demanding
State for another charge. If the
requisition process be considered
equivalent to an ordinary warrant,
the analogy would not sustain the
proposition, for it is elementary
law that, save in exceptional cases,
the defendant may be arrested only
upon a warrant describing the
charge, and followed by a prelimi-
nary hearing. When these safe
guards are not followed the pris-
oner will be relieved upon a habeas
corpus, or by quashing the indict-
nient.
B. CLINTON RPHOADS.
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE.
ABSTRACTS FROM THE OPINION OF MR. JUSTICE JACKSON IN THE
. PRINcIPAL CASE.
"Now, the proposition advanced on behalf of the plaintiff in error
in support of the federal right claimed to have been denied him is that,
inasmuch as interstate rendition can only be effected when the perpon
demanded as a fugitive from justice is duly charged with some particular
offence, or offences, his surrender upon such demand carries with it the
implied condition that he is to be tried alone for the designated crime,
and that in respect to all offences other than those specified in the
demand for his surrender, he has the same right of exemption as a
fugitive from justice extradited from a foreign nation. This proposition
assumes, as is broadly claimed, that the States of the Union are inde-
pendent governments, having the full prerogatives and powers of nations,
except what have been conferred upon the general government, and not
only have the right to granti, but do, in fact, afford to all persons within
their boundaries an asylum as broad and secure as that which inde-
pendent nations extend over their citizens and inhabitants.
"If the premises on which this argument is based were sound, the
conclusion might be correct. But the fallacy of the argument lies in the
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assumption that the States of the Union occupy toward each other ir
respect to fugitives from justice the relation of foreigi nations, in the
same sense ifi which .the general government stands toward independent
sovereignties on that subject; .and in the further. assumption that a
* fugitive from justice acquires in the State to which he may flee some-
State or personal right of protection, improperly called a right of asylum,
which secures to him exemption from trial and punishment for a crime
committed in another State, unless such crime is made the special object
or ground of his rendition.
"To apply the rule of international or foreign extradition, as an-
nounced in United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S., 407, to interstate rendi-
tio'n, involves the confusion of two essentially different things, which
rest upon entirely different principles. In the former the extradition
depends upon treaty contract or stipulation, which rests upon good faith,
and in respect to which the sovereign upon whom the demand is made
can exercise discretion, -as well as investigate the charge on which the
surrender is demanded, there being no rule of comity under and by
virtue of which independent nations are required or expected to withhold
from within their jurisdiction the right of asylum. In the matter of
interstate rendition, however, there is the binding-force and obligation,
not of contract, but of the supreme law of the land, which imposes no
conditions or limitations upon the jurisdiction and authority of the State
to which the fugitive is returned.
"If a fugitive may be kidnaped or unlawfully abducted fromf the
State or country of refuge, and be thereafter tried in the State to which
he'is forcibly carried, without violating any right or immunity fecured to.
him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, it is difficult to
understand upon what sound principle can be rested the denial of a
State's authority or jurisdiction to try him for another or different offense
than that for which he was surrendered.
"It is questionable whether the States could constitutionally enter
into any agreement or stipulation with each other for the purpose of
defining or limiting the offenses for which fugitives would or should be
urrendered'"
